Ever eastward? A divided Nato pauses at Russia’s ‘red lines’

Ever eastward? A divided Nato pauses at Russia’s ‘red lines’

By FT Correspondents

Published: April 1 2008 19:45 | Last updated: April 1 2008 19:45

Moscow is no longer the capital of the empire that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created in 1949 to repel. But as alliance leaders gather on Wednesday for a summit in Bucharest, Russia looms over the organisation more tangibly than at any time since the end of the cold war.

As Nato extended into the former Soviet bloc in 1999 with the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Russia’s concerns about that expansion were set aside. When in 2004 it acquired seven further members, including the three Baltic states that were once part of the Soviet Union, Russian hostility was again ignored.

In Riga in 2006, the Russian ghost almost turned up at the feast in the form of President Vladimir Putin – invited to the Latvian capital by the Elysée Palace to celebrate Jacques Chirac’s 74th birthday while the then French president was at a Nato summit. Mr Putin did not appear on that occasion but is expected to arrive on Thursday in Bucharest for a formal meeting on Friday with Nato leaders.

By this point, Nato will have decided whether to invite two other former Soviet states, Ukraine and Georgia, to take a significant step towards joining the alliance. At issue is whether the two should be invited into so-called membership action plans (Maps), the final stage of preparation before countries become Nato members.

Two things make it harder to ignore Russia’s objections this time. First, Nato is considering a move into the heart of the former Soviet Union. Second, Russia has increased the stakes. Its rhetoric has become more strident since the beginning of last year and its actions, including the suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, have in some respects followed suit.

In a speech whose tone shocked western leaders, delivered in Munich in February 2007, Mr Putin rejected western assertions that Nato’s expansion was not directed against Moscow. “I think it is obvious that Nato expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?”

Since then, he has warned that Russia could target rockets at Ukraine if it joined Nato and housed its military bases.

The decision on Ukraine and Georgia has split Nato down the middle, distracting attention from other issues the leaders will address: the accession of more Balkan states to Nato; the alliance’s difficult mission in Afghanistan; and the consequences of France’s momentous decision to reintegrate itself with Nato’s military structure, from which it withdrew in 1966.

Washington is leading the charge for the invitations to Ukraine and Georgia. It is backed strongly by the states of the former Soviet bloc, which would prefer allies between them and Russia. But it is opposed by most of the continental western European members of Nato, led by Germany but including France, Italy, Belgium and Spain.

The issue is complicated by US President George W.Bush’s desire for a legacy. Bucharest will be his last Nato summit and has long been seen by the US as an occasion to bring the two big former Soviet countries closer to the alliance. That goal is particularly important for the US president, who has vigorously championed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s “orange” and “rose” revolutions. Indeed, Mr Bush has depicted the two events as key developments in his agenda of encouraging the spread of freedom across the world – an agenda that has faltered in other regions, not least the Middle East.

“I do know that one of the signals we’re going to have to send, and must send, is [that] there is a clear path forward for Ukraine and Georgia,” Mr Bush said last week. “I’ve analysed the situation and I believe it’s in [our interest] that there is that clear path forward. It’s in the interest of Nato, collectively, and it’s in the interest of each individual country.”

His administration did waver last year in its support, leading many in Nato to believe the issue of expansion had gone away. The US was worried by the formation of a Ukrainian coalition government in 2006 under Viktor Yanukovich, the losing candidate in the 2004 presidential election, and the declaration of a state of emergency last November by President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia. But Washington went on to develop a working relationship with Mr Yanukovich, who in any case fell from power last December, and welcomed both Mr Saakashvili’s decision to end the state of emergency and his victory in Georgia’s presidential elections in January.

Yet Mr Bush’s efforts to convince Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and others appear to have fallen on deaf ears, heightening tensions between Washington and Berlin that broke into the open this year over troop contributions to Afghanistan.

The US president’s lame-duck status has undoubtedly reduced his powers of persuasion in Berlin. Germany argues that the move would be highly provocative, given that Dmitry Medvedev’s inauguration as Russia’s president on May 7 may mark the start of a more co-operative phase in relations between Russia and the west. Ms Merkel contends that the move should be delayed for a few years. Ms Merkel’s spokesman said on Monday that internal factors in the two countries – such as political unrest in Georgia and the lack of support for Nato membership among Ukrainians – meant they were “not yet ripe” for a Map.

Other European countries also recognise that Russia is justifiably sensitive on the issue, especially as far as Ukraine is concerned. “A point often overlooked is that at least one-third of the military equipment procured by Russia comes from factories that are situated in Ukraine,” says one Nato ambassador. “So this is a genuinely very difficult issue for Russia.”

Russia sees Nato membership for Ukraine, in particular, as a “red line” the alliance should not cross. While saying they respect Ukraine’s independence, Kremlin officials point out that Ukraine is seen as the cradle of the Russian nation (Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, has long been known as the “mother of Russian cities”). Moscow also worries over the implications for its Black Sea fleet based at Sevastopol, the Crimean port that is part of Ukraine.

But Moscow also sees Georgian membership as potentially destabilising, largely because of the unresolved status of Georgia’s separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which have developed close ties with Russia. One analyst familiar with the Kremlin’s thinking warns that should Georgia become a Nato member, any skirmish on the Abkhazian-Georgian border could become dangerous if the Georgian leadership then blames Russia. “What’s next, article five?” he asks, referring to the provision in the Nato treaty stating that an attack on one member shall be considered an attack on all.

US officials, however, stress that at issue this week is not the two countries joining the alliance but merely taking steps towards their joining. As one puts it: “Is Ukraine ready now for membership? I would say no. In three years, probably still no – but five, 10 or 15 years?”

The Washington officials are also trying to turn the German argument on its head. According to them, any move by Nato to embrace the former Soviet republics would always be difficult for the Russians. But if a move on Georgia and Ukraine is delayed for another year or so, it would undermine relations in 2009 between Mr Medvedev and a newly elected US president.

According to this argument, it is therefore better for Nato to get the decision out of the way in the final stages of the Bush and Putin presidencies. The issue also feeds into other discussions between the US and Moscow on a new strategic approach, suggested by Mr Bush to Mr Putin in a letter last month. That would try to address, among other things, Moscow’s concerns about US plans for a missile defence system to be based in Europe, as well as begin discussions about a treaty on limiting each country’s nuclear warheads.

US diplomats argue that the extension of Nato to former Soviet bloc countries has improved those nations’ relations with Moscow. “Arguably, the relations that the Baltic states now have with Moscow are more peaceful, more successful in security terms and in trade terms than they were before they entered Nato. So it’s time for Nato to stop being a four-letter word in Moscow,” says Victoria Nuland, US ambassador to Nato.

The leaders of both Georgia and Ukraine continue to push strongly for invitations. Mr Saakashvili said in an interview last week that denying the applications by Ukraine and Georgia would in effect hand a veto to Russia over Nato membership and amount to “appeasement”. Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine’s president, depicted Nato membership as crucial for his country’s sovereignty. “In the last 80 years Ukraine declared its independence five times. Four times, we lost it. Why did we lose our sovereignty? Because we didn’t have international guarantees for our security. In other words, the question of whether Ukraine will be in Nato or not should be understood in the context of whether Ukraine will be sovereign,” he told foreign journalists last week.

Mr Yushchenko dismissed the idea that Ukraine could harbour foreign bases as contrary to its constitution (although under a 1997 agreement Russia’s Black Sea fleet can stay in Sevastopol until 2017) and said the prospect of integration with the alliance was becoming more popular among Ukrainians, a trend that would continue as old Soviet-era stereotypes faded.

Still, he appeared to recognise the likelihood that, this year at least, his country would not receive a Map invitation. “I have no doubt that we will receive a positive signal. In what form? This is a secondary issue. But I am convinced there will be a positive signal,” he said.

European officials say several ideas are being discussed to deliver such a signal. “Why try at all costs to push forward?” asks one senior diplomat. “We could have a very positive message and some very positive words for Ukraine and Georgia . . . try to find something that will be just a little bit less than a true, complete Map and this is what we are for the time being trying to promote.”

“You have to find the right way to proceed: not giving the impression that you are bending under Russian pressure and at the same time not to try to confront them all the time.” But Mr Saakashvili was still pressing late last week against such a compromise. “Anything short of Map, anything – Map minus, an action plan . . . a Georgia-Nato council, promising us Nato visits instead of Map – this all will immediately lead, next morning, to Moscow crying victory.”

Even if he does not get his way, the issue is unlikely to disappear. It may even come back at Nato’s 60th anniversary summit in a year’s time, especially as a US president will have had time to think about the issue for three months after taking office.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato’s secretary-general, said on Monday that whatever was decided in Bucharest, he believed both countries would eventually join Nato. “For me, it’s not so much whether, but when,” he said, emphasising that “Russia is not a factor in the decision-making processes of Nato”. Dmitry Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, said firmly that the comment “definitely would not be appreciated from our side”.